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Abstract
This paper presents a survey of the extant research on herding, from both a theoretical
and an empirical perspective. Theoretical research provides valuable insights into the
key motives underlying investors’ tendencies to herd, while empirical evidence confirms
the presence of herding – to varying degrees – internationally, both at the market level
and for specific investor types. In future research there should be a greater focus on
empirically testing herding intent, herding dynamics at high frequencies and other (non-
equity) asset classes, who follows whom in the stock market, and whether herding can
be profitably exploited. 
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El comportamiento gregario
a examen 
Kallinterakis, Vasileios
Gregoriou, Greg N. 
Resumen
En este artículo se presenta un estudio de la investigación existente sobre el compor-
tamiento gregario, tanto desde una perspectiva teórica como desde un punto de vista
empírico. En general, la investigación teórica ha proporcionado información muy va-
liosa sobre los principales motivos que subyacen a la tendencia de los inversores hacia
este tipo de comportamiento, mientras que la evidencia empírica confirma dicho com-
portamiento –en distinto grado– a escala internacional, tanto a nivel de mercado como
para tipos de inversores específicos. La investigación futura debe centrarse más en la
contrastación empírica de la intención de comportamiento gregario a altas frecuencias
y en otras clases de activos (no accionariales), quién sigue a quién en el mercado de
valores, y si el comportamiento gregario puede ser explotado de manera rentable.
Palabras clave: 
Comportamiento rebaño, cascadas de información, comportamiento rebaño insti-
tucional, finanzas conductuales.
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n 1. Introduction
Herding as a behavioural trait of investors in capital markets has been persistently
identified throughout the centuries, and was first documented during the early stages
of the world’s first stock exchanges. Indeed, the earliest known direct reference to
herding can be traced back to 1688, when Joseph de la Vega published his work “Con-
fusión de Confusiones”1 based on anecdotal evidence from the 17th century Amsterdam
stock exchange, shortly after the collapse of the Tulip bubble that had shaken the
Netherlands in the late 1630s. The 18th century was marked by some of the world’s
most famous bubbles to be blamed on herd instinct, this time in the London (South
Sea Bubble) and Paris (Mississippi Bubble) stock exchanges, while the wider launch
of stock markets internationally from the 19th century onwards saw the advent of herd
behaviour across a number of them during various financial episodes (Galbraith,
1994). Although herding as a topic has primarily been a concern for popular finance
literature over the years, a wave of academic research into its underlying causes began
to emerge from the 1990s onwards. The demand for such research was principally
driven by the remarkably frequent financial crises (1997 Asian crisis; Dot Com bub-
ble-crash; 2008 global credit crisis) stemming from the accelerated process of glob-
alization that improved links between financial markets internationally post-1990. 
The tremendous wealth of research on herding to date, both at an analytical and an
empirical level, has provided novel insights into this behavioural pattern. Evidence from
analytical studies, for example, has yielded useful insights into the theoretical factors
driving the propensity to herd among economic agents with varying degrees of ration-
ality operating in hypothetical market settings characterized by various institutional fea-
tures (see the excellent review by Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). Empirical research, based
on the methodologies proposed during the 1992-2004 period has produced a wide
cross section of evidence pertaining to various market classifications (developed, emerg-
ing, frontier) and investor types (retail, institutional). On a more practical note, herding
has been found to exhibit regular patterns, include size and industry effects, as well as
asymmetric properties conditional on differential market states (e.g. rising/declining
market returns/volatility/volume etc.), while there is evidence to suggest it is not entirely
unrelated to the momentum trading of institutional investors. 
Our survey provides the reader with an integrated picture of the key issues surrounding
herding research to date. Section 2 discusses the main factors driving the propensity
of individuals to mimic their peers in stock markets, while section 3 analyses the key
empirical patterns that herding has been shown to entail in the extant research. Sec-
1 “Merchant: In this chaos of opinions, which one is the most prudent? Shareholder: To go in the direction of the waves and not fight against the
powerful currents” (Joseph de la Vega. “Confusión de Confusiones”, adapted from Corzo et al., 2014).
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tion 4 concludes the paper with a discussion on research questions that have yet to
be answered and offers an overview of the likely future of herding research. 
n 2. Herd behaviour: Theoretical perspectives
Herding involves imitation following interactive observation of actions or outcomes
of those actions (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). As a result, when herding occurs in the
stock market, individuals copy the trades of others, regardless of whether their infor-
mation dictated an alternative course of action or whether they had no information
from the outset. The issue, therefore, is not whether individuals herd but rather, why.
Research to date (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000; Holmes et al., 2013; Gavriilidis
et al., 2013; Economou et al., 2015b; Galariotis et al., 2015) has attempted to answer
this question by proposing a dichotomous typology of herding, distinguishing be-
tween “intentional” and “spurious” herding. 
Intentional herding primarily involves imitation motivated by the expectation of some
benefit accruing from it and is normally found in situations where some kind of asym-
metry exists, be it actual or perceived. In other words, investors mimic their peers in an-
ticipation of a payoff they could not themselves realize in the absence of imitation (i.e.
based on their own merit or information). Research has identified two distinct types of
payoffs capable of driving intentional herding: informational and professional. 
Informational payoffs motivate herding when investors believe themselves to be at an in-
formational disadvantage vis-à-vis their peers, and hence opt to copy the latter’s trades
in order to free-ride on their informational content (Devenow and Welch, 1996). The
source of this disadvantage stems from either the low quality of investors’ information
or their lack of information-processing skills compared to their counterparts whom they
perceive as better informed. From the moment investors choose to sideline their private
signals in favour of imitating the actions of others, this can give rise to temporary block-
ages of information, whereby investors trade in a given direction simply because their
predecessors did so (irrespective of whether these predecessors traded based on infor-
mation or not). This is clearly detrimental to a market’s informational efficiency; indeed,
if one assumes an efficient market to be one in which prices reflect all available infor-
mation at any point in time over time (Fama, 1991), herding obviously deters (or, at
best, delays) the incorporation of information into prices, thus leading to the creation
of a backlog of “hidden” information and degrading the pool of public information
(Lee, 1998). If enough investors opt for such behaviour, it can lead to trading trends
being set in motion on the basis of very little information, thus triggering the emergence
of informational cascades (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992). These cascades
tend to be characterized by path-dependence, since the actions of the first few movers
can shape the trajectory of the followers’ trades; however, this also renders them very
fragile, since the arrival of little new information in the market can dislodge the (equally
scarce) information on which they were founded in the first place (Lee, 1998; Moscarini
et al., 1998). Cascades are facilitated by the presence of options that are discrete (Vives,
1993) and limited, as both features make it more likely that investors will eventually
converge towards one of them. Occasionally, cascading is a function of information-
collection incentives. The higher the cost of information, the more likely it is that in-
vestors will choose to infer the information from the trades of those they consider
informed, rather than pay to acquire it. If observing the trades of others is not possible,
observational learning can rely on statistical summary gauges; historical prices are a
good example here, as they provide investors with a (noisy) summary indicator of past
aggregate market activity. Vives (1993) and Cao and Hirshleifer (1997) have demon-
strated how the sequence of historical prices provides investors with an indirect inference
of their peers’ trades at the aggregate level, thus removing the necessity – and the con-
comitant cost – of having to observe their peers’ actions directly. Joining a cascade is
also a response to the limits of human cognition, in particular, limits to attention and
processing (Hirshleifer et al., 2001), since environments rich in information signals can
make the observation and deciphering of information arduous for the average investor.
Such investors may deem it easier to focus on the trades of others as a means of dealing
with the complexity of the informational environment. 
Professional payoffs are a key driver of the herding documented among investment profes-
sionals, such as fund managers and financial analysts. The crux of the argument here is
that investment professionals’ performance is assessed in relative terms (i.e. versus the
performance of their peers), leading them to monitor their peers’ actions closely in order
to avoid falling behind the industry average, since any underperformance can negatively
affect their professional prospects (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). A low-skilled (“bad”)
fund manager, for instance, would prefer to mimic the trades of a highly skilled (“good”)
fund manager to give his assessors the impression that he is highly skilled as well. The
actions of the “bad” manager in this case stem from three factors: a subjective uncer-
tainty regarding each manager’s skills (his assessors do not have perfect knowledge
about his skills); an objective asymmetry (the “bad” manager knows he lacks the skills
of his “good” counterparts); and an equally objective risk aversion (his relative under-
performance can be readily verified, thus compromising his professional future). Taken
together, these factors fuel his herding intent. This behaviour is particularly important
during periods of market downturns, where the likelihood of losses is greater, since a
“bad” manager can then claim that he made the same trades as his “good” peers (in ef-
fect claiming that he is of equally high ability) and blame his losses on the overall adverse
state of the market. Such imitative intent can, however, also occur during rising markets,
since underperforming during bullish periods can help reveal a “bad” manager’s short-
comings. Research to date has identified two types of professional payoffs as motivating
12
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factors underlying intentional herding: reputation and compensation schemes. Highly
reputed professionals will choose to imitate their peers in order to protect their reputa-
tion when having to make a decision (Graham, 1999); this is because, if the decision
proves to be wrong, the damage to their reputation will exceed any reputational benefits
they would enjoy should the decision turn out to be correct. However, investment pro-
fessionals of poor repute are also susceptible to herding, since by doing so they can free-
ride on the (presumably better) skills of their well-reputed peers (Trueman, 1994; Welch,
2000; Clement and Tse, 2005). Compensation schemes have also been shown (Cheval-
lier and Ellison, 1999; Graham, 1999) to be important in determining whether invest-
ment professionals opt for herding or choose to utilize their private signals.
Turning now to spurious herding, this occurs when investors exhibit similar reactions to
commonly observed signals. In this case, investors’ trades exhibit correlation although
this does not stem from investors actually observing each other (i.e. herding does not
actually take place); rather it is the presence of an (endogenous or exogenous) factor to
which they are all commonly exposed that leads to similar trades. There are two main
sources of spurious herding, relative homogeneity and characteristic trading. Relative homo-
geneity refers to the presence of features that increase commonality among investment
professionals and which prompt them to generate similar responses (De Bondt and Teh,
1997). Fund managers, for example, tend to share similar educational backgrounds and
professional qualifications and also tend to investigate similar indicators (macroeco-
nomic, financial, etc.), which they also tend to interpret in a similar fashion (Froot 
et al., 1992; Hirshleifer et al., 1994)2. Another factor that has been found to promote
homogeneity in the trades of investment professionals is the regulatory framework to
which they are subject. Evidence, for example, from emerging markets3’ pension funds
(Voronkova and Bohl, 2005; Olivares, 2008) has indicated that their institutional frame-
work imposes strict minimum performance requirements, which, coupled with profiling
restrictions on the stocks in which they are allowed to invest, leads them to hold very
similar portfolios. In addition, British pension funds reveal a strong indication of herding
behaviour in groups when buying/selling stocks and bonds as well as alternative asset
classes, which is in line with the notion of reputational herding (Blake et al., 2015), a
finding further confirmed by Broeders et al. (2016). According to Jame (2011) pension
funds find it difficult and risky to deviate from what other pension funds are buying and
selling, thus resulting in automatic rebalancing and herding. 
Spurious herding can also be the product of the similar investment strategies em-
ployed by professional investors. Fund managers have been found to be very prone
13
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2 The case where investors trade similarly because their information sets are positively correlated (i.e. they are employing similar signals) is also
known as “investigative herding” (see Sias, 2004).
3 The references mentioned here pertain to the well-researched cases of pension funds investment behaviour in Chile and Poland. 
to utilizing characteristic trading (Bennett et al., 2003). The term “characteristic 
trading”, also known as “style investing”, refers to strategies of opting for stocks
with specific characteristics. Examples of such characteristics include past perform-
ance (momentum and contrarian strategies), fundamental pricing (value and growth
strategies), industry classification (sector strategies), capitalization (size strategies)
and religious or ethical principles (ethical investing and Sharia-compliant strategies).
If several institutional investors pursue a specific strategy, then their trades will ex-
hibit correlation without any interactive observation having occurred; the mere fact
that they all adhere to the same style of investment is enough to create the impression
of herding, without herding actually being at work. In particular, evidence from a
variety of studies (Grinblatt et al., 1995; Choe et al., 1999; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999;
Wermers, 1999; Sias, 2004; Choi and Sias, 2009) shows that fund managers are at-
tracted to momentum trading (“trend-chasing”) while also herding at the same time.
The relationship, however, between herding and momentum trading has not been
consistently found to exhibit significance. It is reasonable to expect that the wide
popularity of momentum trading among institutional investors would suggest that
they would tend to buy (sell) similar winners (losers) over time, thus giving the im-
pression of herding. However, as mentioned above, herding presupposes interactive
observation, and this is largely unnecessary among investors using the same strategy;
any similarity in their trades may well be merely the result of their common use of
the particular strategy they employ. 
Less-than-perfectly rational factors have been found to be relevant to herding, either
in conjunction with the abovementioned intentional/spurious ones or in isolation. A
typical example here relates to behavioural forces, including the availability heuristic
and home bias. Investors, for example, have been found to be partial to investing in
stocks whose companies’ headquarters are in close proximity to their home, with the
portfolios of most investors showing a heavy bias towards their home market’s stocks
(home bias). Such a tendency has been found (see e.g. Seasholes and Zhu, 2010) to
amplify the correlation in trades among “home biased” investors. Kuran and Sunstein
(1999) have linked home bias to informational reasons related to within-community
dynamics. The issue here is that a community (social or professional) encourages
preference towards home-stocks (being “home”, they are better-known), thus causing
the community’s pool of information to be dominated by news regarding these stocks
only. This availability bias then tacitly prompts investors to participate in an avail-
ability cascade of preferences towards home-stocks (Andrikopoulos et al., 2014).
Home-bias can be further reinforced by other psychological vehicles, including famil-
iarity bias (investors choosing stocks that appear more familiar – see Huberman,
2001), recognition heuristic (investors choosing stocks with higher recognisability –
see Boyd, 2001) and conformity (a community can increase the tendency among its
members to conform to the norm – see Hirshleifer, 2001). 
14
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The discussion so far has shown that although herding per se may appear to be a
straightforward activity, it may have a range of roots and causes. Motivated by these
theoretical considerations – and by the greater incidence of financial crises over the
past two decades – a series of studies have been devoted to the empirical research of
herding, in order to confirm its existence, its patterns and the effect it has on capital
markets. The next section therefore presents a more detailed overview of the extant
empirical evidence from the herding literature. 
n 3. Herd behaviour: Empirical evidence
Herding is perhaps one of the most widely empirically researched areas of behavioural
finance, with herding studies normally relying on one of two types of data, namely
aggregate data (such as prices and volume) and microdata (proprietary data on investors’
accounts, portfolios and transactions). Empirical research on herding has grown since
the 1990s, following the establishment of the herding measures by Lakonishok et al.
(1992) and Christie and Huang (1995). The Lakonishok et al. (1992) model hinged
on measuring the herding of market participants at the micro level (the authors used
US funds portfolio data as input) and provided a picture of herding within a period
based on the cross-sectional fraction of buyers (i.e. funds increasing their position in
stocks within a particular period). Sias (2004) improved on that measure, testing di-
rectly for the inter-temporal (period-on-period) dependence of the cross-sectional in-
stitutional demand; he then decomposed the cross-sectional correlation of this
demand into two parts, one pertaining to habit investing (funds following their past
trades) and one reflecting herding (funds following the trades of other funds). At the
macro (aggregate) level, Christie and Huang (1995) proposed a model based on the
relationship between the cross-sectional dispersion of returns and extreme market re-
turns; regressing the former on the latter, their aim was to test whether herding could
be reflected in a negative relationship between the two. The explanation for such a
relationship is that herding in the market would lead individual equity returns to clus-
ter more closely around the market average, hence leading to a reduction in their
cross-sectional deviation. However, their model used a linear regression design and
was thus unable to capture potential non-linearities in that relationship, despite
wide evidence linking herding with non-linear dynamics in capital markets (e.g. Lux,
1995).4 Chang et al. (2000) incorporated this into their model, which tested simul-
taneously for both the linear and the non-linear relationship between the cross-sec-
tional return dispersion and market returns. An additional advantage of their model
was that, unlike Christie and Huang (1995), they tested for herding on the premise
15
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4 It is interesting to note here that herding studies employing the Christie and Huang (1995) model have almost never produced evidence in
support of herding, Christie and Huang (1995) included.
of the entire market return distribution and not only during extreme return periods.
The latest fundamental evolution of Chang et al. (2000)’s model came from Hwang
and Salmon (2004), who tested for herding based on the cross section of securities’
factor sensitivities, by a Kalman filter to extract herding from the cross section of a
market’s stock-betas. Although the methodological design they proposed was econo-
metrically more complex, it offered the key advantage that, for the first time, it en-
abled a graphical visualization of herding.
Empirical research on herding has allowed us to establish certain stylized facts re-
garding herding properties internationally. To begin with, herding appears more sig-
nificant in emerging markets than in developed markets, confirmed by results at both
the aggregate and the micro level. Fund managers, for example, tend to herd more in
markets such as Poland (Voronkova and Bohl, 2005), Portugal (Holmes et al., 2013),
South Korea (Choe et al., 1999) and Taiwan (Demirer et al., 2010; Hung et al., 2010;
Lu et al., 2012), rather than the US (Lakonishok et al., 1992; Grinblatt et al., 1995;
Wermers, 1999)5 or the UK (Wylie, 2005). At the macro level, Chang et al. (2000)
found significant herding for the emerging, but not the developed markets of their
sample, while further evidence of emerging market herding was reported by Chiang
et al. (2010), Chiang and Zheng (2010) and Tan et al. (2008). As Gelos and 
Wei (2005) argued, this should be attributed to the relatively lower transparency of
emerging markets which renders the quality of public information ambiguous, thus
prompting institutional investors to mimic each other when trading there.6
Specifically, with respect to institutional herding, mutual funds buy and sell stocks
and closely track the herd of hedge funds, with mutual funds having a positive effect
on the earlier quarter’s hedge fund herding (Jiao and Ye, 2014). However, Jiao and Ye
further argued that hedge funds do not follow mutual funds and that hedge funds
do not disrupt stock prices, with the top 30% of the most actively traded mutual funds
closely following hedge funds, thereby forcing stock price reversals. A notable study
by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) highlights that during the Nasdaq bubble, hedge
funds did not apply downward pressure on stock prices but were fully invested in tech
stocks and due to their short selling strategies were able to unwind their leveraged
positions by minimizing losses and circumventing further declines.7 Using 13F position
reports, Zykaj et al. (2014) claimed that there is some herding and crowding in hedge
16
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5 A very interesting issue with regards to the US market is that US fund managers appear to herd more when the Sias (2004) framework is
employed, compared to the one by Lakonishok et al. (1992), thus suggesting that different models may capture different types of herding;
alternatively, since the Sias (2004) model has been used on data covering more recent periods, this may be due to the growing share of unskilled
fund managers in the US market over the past decades, who, due to their lack of skill would be more likely to consider herding (for more on
this, see Barras et al., 2010).
6 Economou et al. (2015b) recently produced evidence of herding among fund managers in the category of frontier markets, by investigating
institutional herding in Bulgaria and Montenegro. 
7 The Nasdaq Composite Index and Nasdaq 100 Index dropped –67.18% and –73.45% respectively from January 2000 to December 2002, while
during the same period the Hedge Fund Research (HFR) Hedge Fund Weighted Composite Index appreciated 8.24%. 
funds, but it is less than that encountered among other institutional investors, with
hedge funds rarely participating in momentum trading strategies due to both their
short selling and the fact that they have different styles from mutual funds. It should
be understood that hedge fund data is monthly and, due to the high frequency of
their trading, said data only provides insight into a fraction of their trades. This situ-
ation is exacerbated by the fact that the SEC does not require short trades to be dis-
closed. In addition, hedge funds are known for their performance fee structure, which
means they have significantly higher disclosure standards in order to guard their su-
perior stock selection abilities, investment ideas and marketing-timing skills and thus
take advantage of inefficiencies in global markets. However, Zykaj et al. (2014) found
that hedge fund herding is not linked to extreme market events or market pressure.
On the other hand, Ben-David et al. (2011) discovered that hedge funds did herd in
the 2008 crisis but 18% less than mutual funds, which is contrary to what the media
suggested at the time, namely that hedge funds tended to destabilize markets. In ad-
dition, hedge funds are not seen as destabilizing global stock markets but rather hedge
fund herding is based on profitable opportunities with herding being more prominent
in small cap stocks (Mattes, 2014). Likewise, Mattes (2014, p.39) found some “weak
evidence” to suggest that trading with the herd helps to generate superior returns,
stating that the “…selling of past losers is still pronounced but the strongest herding
is in buying and selling past winners”. Furthermore, Gray (2009) finds that hedge
fund herding is not related to money flows, whereas Mattes (2014) discovers that
money flows appear to be robust in stocks displaying a large degree of herding but
hedge fund inflows and outflows display low correlation with herding. By examining
age, Boyson (2010) finds that older (senior) hedge fund managers that diverge away
from the herd have a higher likelihood of failure and her findings illustrate that hedge
fund managers with more experience herd more than managers with less experience.
Another interesting finding regarding herding internationally is that it manifests itself
with a size effect. Many studies on herding (Lakonishok et al., 1992; Wermers, 1999;
Chang et al., 2000; Sias, 2004; Wylie, 2005; Hung et al., 2010) have reported strong
herding among small capitalization stocks; this has been ascribed to these stocks’
greater information risk8, which thus prompts investors to copy their peers’ trades in
order to tackle their informational predicament. There is also evidence (Wylie, 2005;
Kremer and Nautz, 2013), however, of fund managers herding significantly towards
the largest stocks in international markets. This is a very interesting finding, consid-
ering that large cap stocks do not suffer from the dearth of information that affects
small cap ones. One possible explanation for this is that institutional investors’ per-
17
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8 Information risk in small stocks (due to their lack of wider coverage by analysts) leads to less attention/interest on the part of investors and,
hence, lower volumes. This, in turn, gives rise to higher liquidity risk for small stocks, which can further encourage herding; investors wishing to
enter/exit positions in/from illiquid stocks will likely trade as soon as their volume picks up, i.e. when they see other investors trading those
stocks. 
formance is often benchmarked against a blue chip index and this prompts them to
track that index which means they end up holding a portfolio whose composition
mirrors the index one.9 Apart from the size effect, herding internationally presents us
with industry effects as well, with its significance manifesting itself across various sec-
tors for different markets (Voronkova and Bohl, 2005; Choi and Sias, 2009; Zhou
and Lai, 2009; Demirer et al., 2010; Gavriilidis et al., 2013; Gebka and Wohar, 2013). 
Another interesting issue is that herding is affected by the outbreak of financial crises,
be they local or global. Hwang and Salmon (2004) showed that market-wide herding
declined in the US and South Korea following the onset of the Asian crisis (1997-
1998), while Choe et al. (1999) found that foreign funds showed less herding behav-
iour in South Korea following the outbreak of that crisis. However, other studies (Kim
and Wei, 2002; Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Mobarek et al., 2014) report a rise in herd-
ing following the outbreak of various crises, while Economou et al. (2015b) find mixed
evidence on the effect of the 2008 global crisis on institutional herding in Balkan mar-
kets. The effect of financial crises on herding might be explained by the fact that crises
lead to the unveiling of novel fundamentals, which can both collapse the pre-crisis
consensus on which investors herded (which would explain why there is less herding
post crises) and give rise to a new consensus on which investors can herd (which
would explain why there is more herding post crises)10.
Herding has also been found to be induced internationally by US market returns, as
recent evidence by Chiang and Zheng (2010) and Economou et al. (2015a) indicates,
while the CBOE VIX index11 (also known as the “fear index”) has also been found 
to motivate herding both within and outside the US (Chiang et al., 2013; Philippas 
et al., 2013). Such an effect is perhaps to be expected, considering the pivotal role of
US stock markets in the global financial system. 
Perhaps the most persistent finding in the herding literature is that herding is asym-
metric in equity markets, with its significance varying across different states of the
market. A wealth of studies have conditioned herding on variables such as market re-
turns, market volatility and market volume, with results overwhelmingly confirming
that herding varies with market conditions. This variation is by no means uniform
across capital markets; herding has been found to be significant during periods of
negative market returns (Goodfellow et al., 2009; Zhou and Lai, 2009; Demirer et al.,
2010; Economou et al., 2011; Holmes et al., 2013; Gavriilidis et al., 2013), positive
market returns (Economou et al., 2015a; Economou et al., 2015b), low or decreasing
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9 Walter and Weber (2006) called this “benchmark” herding. 
10 For more on this, see Borio (2008).
11 The CBOE VIX, which was launched in 1993, is an implied volatility index calculated based on the expected volatility of the S&P500 index
constituents’ options over the following 30 days. 
volatility (Economou et al., 2011; Holmes et al., 2013; Economou et al., 2015b), high
volatility (Blasco et al., 2012; Economou et al., 2015b), high or rising volume (Gavri-
ilidis et al., 2013; Economou et al., 2015b) and low volume (Tan et al., 2008;
Economou et al., 2011). Other studies have produced evidence against the presence
of asymmetric herding (Chang et al., 2000; Caparelli et al., 2004) and others (Chiang
and Zheng, 2010; Chiang et al., 2010; Chiang et al., 2013) have produced mixed evi-
dence in that respect.
Aside from the extant evidence on institutional investors’ herding, retail investors’ be-
haviour has also been studied, with evidence to date (Kumar and Lee 2006; Dorn et al.
2008; Kaniel et al., 2008; Kumar 2009; Barber et al., 2009a; 2009b) suggesting the pres-
ence of pronounced herding in that segment. This is a very promising area of research,
since individual investors’ herding can be examined using both empirical as well as ex-
perimental approaches (through experiments in controlled environments, something
which is very hard to do in the case of institutional investors). Perhaps the biggest ob-
stacle faced by those researching retail herding is data-availability; whereas institutional
holdings’ databases are occasionally available due to disclosure requirements, retail
trades/portfolios are much harder to attain as they are considered private data and are
thus less likely to be shared by their proprietors (e.g. banks, brokers etc.). 
Finally, a promising area of research is the one attempting to determine whether herd-
ing is intentional or spurious. Evidence on this mainly stems from microdata studies
at the market (Holmes et al., 2013; Economou et al., 2015b) and industry level (Gavri-
ilidis et al., 2013); basing the detection of herding intent on the interaction between
herding and market/sector conditions, the above studies have noted that fund man-
agers herd intentionally in various markets. The seminal attempt to address this issue
at the market level was made by Galariotis et al. (2015), who identified herding intent
by extracting the fundamentals-driven component from the cross-sectional dispersion
of returns in the Chang et al. (2000) model. The advantage of these studies is that
they push the frontier of research beyond testing whether herding exists or not towards
identifying what motivates herding. 
n 4. Conclusion 
A huge amount of research on herding has been carried out since the early 1990s and
has provided numerous insights into what motivates herding theoretically, as well as
about whether investors herd internationally. This section focuses on what remains
to be established by future herding research. First of all, although we know much
about why investors herd in theory, the corresponding empirical evidence is rather
scarce, aside from the few studies mentioned above on intentional versus spurious
19
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herding. Whether institutional herding, for example, is the product of intent or the
outcome of fund managers’ spuriously synchronized trades is important, both for
regulators (herding can potentially destabilize stock markets) and investors in mutual
funds (herding constitutes an undeclared passive investment strategy that may lead
to sub-optimal portfolio structures for these funds’ investors; Economou et al.,
2015b). Second, it is worth noting that we still lack a model that enables us to identify
exactly who follows whom in capital markets; although herding reflects the concept
of people following each other, the models currently at hand do not enable us to de-
termine in what order this following occurs. Third, the advent of algorithmic/high
frequency trading during the past decade or two, poses interesting questions con-
cerning herding dynamics at high and ultra-high frequencies, an issue that has received
very little attention to date12. Fourth, although most evidence on herding emanates
from equity markets, relatively little is known about herding in other asset classes,
such as bonds, exchange-traded funds, derivatives and currencies13; it would be in-
teresting to see more research on those instruments, given their differences in structure
and clientele (institutional investors predominate almost overwhelmingly) compared
to equities. Finally, it would be very interesting to assess whether herding could be
exploited profitably, especially given earlier research (De Long et al., 1990) on rational
speculators profiting at the expense of noise traders. Admittedly, the issue here is to
come up with a herding measure that allows us to identify herding as a discrete or
continuous variable for forecasting purposes; the Hwang and Salmon (2004) model
goes some way towards satisfying this condition (it allows herding to be extracted as
a time series and portrayed graphically), yet at low (monthly) frequencies, which do
not appeal to professional investors, whose trades are conducted at higher frequen-
cies. Many of the above issues are likely to be addressed in the near future, if both
new empirical designs and – most importantly – more sophisticated databases (al-
lowing greater identification of who is trading at the tick level) are developed. 
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12 Gleason et al. (2004) and Henker et al. (2006) reported no intra-day herding for US sector ETFs and the Australian equity market, respectively;
on the other hand, Zhou and Lai (2009) showed that investors herded significantly intra-daily in Hong Kong equities, particularly towards a)
small capitalization stocks, b) the sell-side and c) when the market slumped, while significant intra-day herding was also reported by Blasco 
et al. (2011; 2012) for the Spanish equity market.
13 Bond herding has been investigated by Oehler and Chao (2000), Cai et al. (2012) and Galariotis et al. (forthcoming), herding in the futures
market has been investigated by Kodres and Pritsker (1997), Gleason et al. (2003) and Weiner (2006), herding in ETFs has been tested for the
first time by Chen et al. (2012) and herding in the currency market has been investigated by Carpenter and Wang (2006) and Sherman (2011).  
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